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ABSTRACT. The article begins with a brief history of 
aesthetic theory. Particular attention is given to the 
postructuralist ‘aesthetic return’: the resurgence of interest 
in aesthetics as an ontological foundation for human being­
in-the-world. The disordered individual-as-emergent­
artist-and-artifact, who is at the centre of this ‘aesthetic 
return’, is then translated into the ‘dis’-organization that is 
the firm. The firm is thus defined in terms of its primal 
sensory impact on the world. It invokes a myriad of aes­
thetic relations between its disorganized self and others: its 
essence resides within these relations; its power of being is 
determined by its ability to project a unified aesthetic ideal – 
a ‘mirror fantasy’. The firm thus emerges as a style: where 
style is defined as an organizing – a sculpting – of aesthetic 
chaos. In order to achieve a grand style, the firm projects 
itself through time as a unified aesthetic ideal; as an ongoing 
work of art. The article concludes with a discussion of how 
this aesthetic theory of the firm relates to other accepted 
theories of the nature and purpose of business organizations. 
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…what is required…is to stop courageously at the 
surface, the fold, the skin, to adore appearance, to 
believe in form, tunes, words, in the whole Olympus 
of appearance. Those Greeks were superﬁcial – out of 
profundity. 
Nietzsche, The Gay Science ([1882], 1974, p. 38). 
Introduction 
The history of the study of aesthetics is vast and 
diverse. Theories concerning the importance of 
aesthetics stretch back to the origins of philosophy 
(Nehemas, 1998). Recently, the study of aesthetics 
has been embraced by architecture, art theory, 
literary criticism, musicology, ﬁlm theory, and 
psychology; rather than a uniﬁed narrative, aesthetics 
‘‘is a set of discourses we have inherited’’ (Herwitz, 
2008, p. 171). Pre-Socratic origins of the word are 
etymologically derived from the Greek equivalents 
‘to gasp’ or to ‘breath in suddenly’ (Onians, [1951], 
1988); the word is also linked to ‘play’ and being 
‘beyond time’: 
Phenomena which manifest or appear with the 
impact of a prominent or memorable emer­
gence…provoke the involuntary intake of breath…A 
gasp of this order ‘stops’, as it were, time itself – one is 
invariably ‘breathless’ before the emergence of the 
authentically beautiful…It goes without saying that 
such provocations to our everyday are more than just 
‘‘smart and pretty’’ (Postrel, 2003, p. 182), at the very 
least they launch a thousand ships. [Chytry, 2007, 
p. 40] 
In the context of the foundational and pre-
contextual nature of aesthetic judgment, Chytry 
notes ‘‘the vital discovery that Schiller borrowed 
and expanded from Kant of the aesthetic as focused 
on the ‘free play’ of human faculties whenever 
understanding and imagination are in a state of 
spontaneous openness or ‘indeterminability’ prior 
to being ‘constrained’ either toward adopting a 
cognitive or a moral stance’’ (p. 37). 
In terms of developing a ‘general theory’ of aes­
thetics, Kant’s Critique of Judgment is generally viewed 
as seminal (Herwitz, 2008; Nehemas, 1998). Kant 
deﬁnes aesthetic appreciation in terms of ‘‘the faculty 
of estimating an object or a mode of representation by 
means of a delight or aversion apart from any interest. 
The object of such delight is called beautiful’’ ([1790], 
1952, p. 139). ‘Apart from any interest’ implies that 
aesthetic judgment does not rest on ulterior utilitarian 
motives: the ‘‘aesthetic attitude [is] the disinterested 
(with no ulterior purpose) and sympathetic attention 
to and contemplation of any object of awareness 
whatever, for its own sake’’ (Stolnitz, 1960, p. 32). 
Kieran provides an arboreal illustration: 
We might look at a tree in the garden and be 
interested in it in terms of what species it is (theoretical 
interest) or whether it is blocking out the sun and 
should be cut back (practical interest). However, we 
might just sit back and attend to the contours of the 
trunk and branches, their stratiﬁcation, the way the 
leaves rustle and sway gently in the wind, the dappled 
shadows cast on the bough, the bent-arm-like crook 
of a branch as it stretches out. In this case we’re dis­
interested since we look at the tree and, if we’re lucky, 
so doing will afford us pleasure. [2005, p. 67] 
Nietzsche, anticipating Freud, recognizes aes­
thetic attraction as pre-cognitively sensual: ‘‘every 
perfection, all the beauty of things, revives through 
contiguity this aphrodisian bliss [die aphrodisische 
Seligkeit]’’ ([1888], 1967, p. 1). Recently, Genette 
has returned to Kant in emphasizing its contempla­
tive nature: ‘‘an experience of intransitive, rapt 
attention on any object which may elicit interest’’ 
(1999, p. 20). Thus any object, and not just objects 
ofﬁcially labelled as ‘art’, can be evaluated on the 
basis of aesthetic quality: ‘‘Aesthetics shows rather 
than tells, delights rather than instructs. The effects 
are immediate, perceptual, and emotional’’ (Postrel, 
2003, p. 6). Murdoch emphasizes the ability of 
aesthetics to transcend personal ego, and to present 
the viewer with an objective vision of reality: 
I am looking out of my window in an anxious and 
resentful state of mind, oblivious to my surroundings, 
brooding perhaps on some damage done to my pres­
tige. Then suddenly I observe a hovering Kestrel. In a 
moment everything is altered. The brooding self with 
its hurt vanity has disappeared…Good art reveals what 
we are usually too selﬁsh and too timid to recognize, 
the minute and absolutely random detail of the world, 
and reveals it together with a sense of unity and form. 
Good art shows us how difﬁcult it is to be objective by 
showing us how differently the world looks to an 
objective vision…It is a kind of goodness by proxy. 
[1980, pp. 84–87] 
Murdoch’s linking of aesthetics with morality and 
with our basic being in the world invokes the most 
foundational aesthetic narrative: the notion of a 
human life itself as a work of art. In this narrative, 
subject and object converge. We are individually 
both the artist and artefact, sculptor and sculpture; 
‘‘the artist as his own spectator’’ (Lamb, 2005, p. 46). 
The projection of our being through time is a pro­
cess of continual creative self-transformation; a 
‘‘sculpting of the self’’ (Peters and Michael, 2005, p.  
383). In The Art of Living, Nehemas describes this 
aesthetics-as-ontology: ‘‘As in the acknowledged 
arts, there are no rules for producing new and 
exciting works. As in the acknowledged arts, there is 
no best work – no best life – by which all others can 
be judged…[But] that does not imply that judgment 
is impossible, that every work is as good as 
every other…[A]esthetic difference and multiplic­
ity…enriches and improves human life’’ (1998, p.  
10). As Nehemas notes, this notion of aesthetics as 
central to human being has a long pedigree stretching 
back through Aristotle to early classicism. It has been 
revived recently by a group of philosophers loosely 
labelled as ‘postsructuralists’ (Cazeaux, 2000; Her­
witz, 2008). In order to develop an aesthetic theory 
of the ﬁrm, it is to narrative that the remainder of 
this article turns. 
The aesthetic return 
In the introduction to The Continental Aesthetics 
Reader, Cazeaux observes that ‘‘[a]esthetics has 
undergone a radical transformation in the last hun­
dred years’’. He continues: 
Traditionally, the subject [of aesthetics] has always 
occupied the margins of philosophy, for the simple 
reason that it deals with those aspects of experience 
which are the least amenable to categorization, i.e., art, 
beauty, emotion, and the ever-changing delights of the 
senses. However, the divisions imposed on reality by 
modern reason and changes brought about by the 
industrialization of experience have necessitated a 
rethinking of the relationship between the individual 
and reality. Gone are notions of a distinct self in receipt 
of a mind-independent world and, in their place, are 
theses to the effect that consciousness and reality are 
interconnected at a fundamental level…The aesthetic, 
formerly exiled from mainstream attention, assumes 
centre-stage as the region to which we can turn for 
new cognitive possibilities and a sensibility that is 
critical of the divisions exercised by modern thought. 
[2000, p. xiii] 
Nietzsche anticipated this aesthetic return by 
centring his philosophy on aesthetics: ‘‘we have 
our highest dignity in our signiﬁcance as works of 
art – for it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that 
existence and the world are eternally justiﬁed –’’ 
([1888], 1967, p. 449). Following Nietzsche, 
Foucault wonders, ‘‘couldn’t everyone’s life be­
come a work of art? Why should the lamp or the 
house be an art object, but not our life?’’ (1973, p.  
350). Following Foucault, the central question 
posed in this article could be summarized as ‘Why 
should the lamp be an art object, but not the ﬁrm 
that produced it?’ Again, this casts the ﬁrm in the 
aesthetic role of both subject and object. It also 
means, as Cummins observes, ‘‘the acceptance of a 
human individual as a metaphor for organization’’ 
(2000, p. 162). However, this metaphor already 
exists in the poststructuralist rendition of the de-
centred individual (Cazeaux, 2000, pp. 367–383). 
Indeed, the essential process of the aesthetics-of­
existence is to use art as a means of ordering and 
harmonizing the disparate human psyche. Thus, 
the human is already decentred; the human is a 
(dis)-organization of emotional drives: ‘‘To be­
come master of the chaos one is; to compel one’s 
chaos to become form…that is the grand ambition 
here’’ (Nietzsche, Will to Power, [1882–1888], 
1967, p. 444). 
This organizing and directing of disparate drives is 
captured by the concept of a stylization of existence: 
‘‘The creation of unity out of diversity is given [by 
Nietzsche] the name ‘style’. Style is the coordinated 
exploitation of powerful instincts…Grand style, as 
demonstrated by classicism, is the effect achieved 
through the harnessing of violent and varied pas­
sions, and their placement under the rule of a pre­
dominant drive’’ (Thiele, 1990, p. 63). Indeed it is 
this concept of style as an organizing, enhancing, and 
directing force – as developed particularly by 
Nietzsche, Foucault, and Derrida – that provides the 
basis here for an aesthetic theory of the ﬁrm. Within 
such a theory the power of the ﬁrm – in the sense of 
the impact through time of the ﬁrm on our world – 
originates not in any material property (size, proﬁt­
ability, etc.) nor in some measure of moral worth, 
but rather in the ﬁrm’s style. Style is the essence of the 
ﬁrm: the grander the style the greater the initiatory 
impact of the ﬁrm: the more powerful the ﬁrm’s 
being. 
Style as the Essence of the ﬁrm 
Essence, from the latin esse ‘to be’ delves beneath 
affective characteristics of the ﬁrm: Is the ﬁrm 
proﬁtable? Is the ﬁrm ethical? It plumbs the depths 
of being in the Heideggerian ([1927] 2008) sense by 
simply asking: Is the ﬁrm? What is the fundamental 
impact of the ﬁrm on our sensory awareness of it? 
Ongoing experimental research in psychology 
indicates that aesthetic impact in general has a 
powerful inﬂuence on both our perception of the 
world, and how we act in the world. Temporally, 
aesthetic impacts can be long and contemplative, or 
pre-attentively instant. For example, a recent study 
by Olson and Marshuetz (2005) ﬁnds that we are 
aesthetically impacted by an object even though it is 
shown to us for just a fraction of a second; indeed we 
are not even aware, consciously, that we have seen 
it. These aesthetic impacts also inﬂuence our non-
aesthetic evaluation of objects: ‘‘Improving the aes­
thetics of a system can have many beneﬁts which 
extend beyond affective issues…[U]sers of an auto­
mated teller machine perceived the system to be 
easier to use based solely on its aesthetic appear­
ance;…attractive things work better’’ (Bauerly and 
Liu, 2008). 
Today, the origin of much of these aesthetic 
impacts – whether intentionally or unintentionally – 
is the ﬁrm. We are awash in business-originating 
aesthetic stimuli: logos, products, advertising, 
architecture, even the phonetic impact of the ﬁrm’s 
name, ﬂood our senses daily. Therefore, again to 
borrow from Heidegger, we are thrown into an 
aesthetic relation to the ﬁrm. This fundamental and 
ongoing sensory relation of us to the ﬁrm that ren­
ders the ﬁrm, at its essence, a work of art. As Genette 
observes: ‘‘it is not the object that makes the relation 
aesthetic, but the relation that makes the object 
aesthetic’’ (1999, p. 11). Our most fundamental 
relation to the ﬁrm is an aesthetic relation through 
time. What determines the power of this aesthetic 
relation? What unites it and intensiﬁes it around a 
given ﬁrm? 
The power of these myriad aesthetic relations 
between us and a given ﬁrm is uniﬁed and intensiﬁed 
by the cultivation of a corporate style: aesthetically, 
the ﬁrm projects itself as a style; the grander the style 
the stronger the attraction of the ﬁrm to us, 
strengthening the aesthetic relation. Thus, within this 
aesthetic theory of the ﬁrm, the ﬁrm itself is at its core 
an idealized assimilation of aesthetic chaos. Thus, 
central to this aesthetic theory of the ﬁrm is the no­
tion of the ﬁrm-as-style. Therefore, the normative 
implication here is of the ﬁrm willing toward a grand 
style. However, what exactly is meant here by the 
notion of the ﬁrm’s aesthetic style? 
The ﬁrm’s style is the essence of the aesthetic 
relations it invokes. Style is the essence both in the 
above sense of esse, of fundamental being; but also in 
the sense of a uniﬁed and intense force that per­
meates – that ﬂavours (to use a culinary metaphor) – 
these myriad aesthetic relations. To illustrate, con­
sider the following passage from Nietzsche’s Joyful 
Wisdom, quoted by Derrida in Spurs: Nietzsche’s 
Styles: 
Here I stand in the midst of the surging of the breakers, 
whose white ﬂames fork up to my feet; -from all sides 
there is howling, threatening, crying, and screaming at 
me, while at the lowest depths the old earth shaker 
sings his aria hollow like a roaring bull; he beats such 
an earth shaker’s measure thereto, that even the hearts 
of these weathered rock-monsters tremble at the 
sound. Then suddenly, as if born out of nothingness, 
there appears before the portal of this hellish labyrinth, 
only a few fathoms distant, – a great sailing ship gliding 
silently along like a ghost. Oh, this ghostly beauty! 
With what enchantment it seizes me! What? Has all 
the repose and silence of the world embarked here? 
Does my happiness itself sit in this quiet place, my 
happier ego, my second immortalized self? …. But 
still! But still! My noble enthusiast, there is also in the 
most beautiful sailing ship so much noise and bustling, 
and alas, so much petty, pitiable bustling! The 
enchantment and the most powerful effect of woman 
is, to use the language of philosophers, an effect at a 
distance, an action in distans; there belongs thereto, 
however, primarily and above all – distance! [In Derrida 
(1978) 1991, pp. 357–358]. 
In the context of an aesthetic theory of the ﬁrm, 
Nietzsche’s ‘‘great sailing ship’’ is the ﬁrm-as-style. 
The ﬁrm’s style/stylus (Nietzche’s sailing-ship’s 
prow) penetrates the turbulent chaos of aesthetic 
stimuli in which we are adrift: ‘‘breaks up the 
waves…[leaving a]…trace, wake, indication, mark’’ 
(Derrida, pp. 355–356). If powerful, the ﬁrm-as­
style appears – necessarily at a distance – as an 
enigmatic but nonetheless desirable temptress, a 
veiled truth-of-being: something we wish to get 
closer to, to form a relation with, to board. How­
ever, why necessarily at a distance? 
Distance is required because style encompasses the 
totality of the individual’s/ﬁrm’s being on the world: 
to see the sailing ship as beautiful we must see its 
totality, which requires distance. I may admire the 
laptop on which I am currently typing as possessing 
aesthetic worth: its soft colours, ﬂowing curvelin­
earity, imaginative logo, may elicit pleasure (perhaps 
even Nietzsche’s ‘aphrodisian bliss’). However, for 
the ﬁrm that produced and/or marketed it to have 
style would require that whatever aesthetic qualities 
this laptop possesses permeates every sensory pro­
jection of this organization. In order to determine 
this requires that the ﬁrm is experienced, and indeed 
experiences itself, from a distance. Here, ‘distance’ is 
not geographic, although physical space is an aspect, 
but rather psychological: the distance of non-preju­
dicial disinterestedness, of experiencing the ﬁrm as a 
uniﬁed aesthetic object, of objectifying the ﬁrm as a 
surface relation. As Genette observes ‘‘objectiﬁcation 
constitutes aesthetic appreciation’’ (1999, p. 89). 
Consider, hypothetically, that I objectify Nike 
Inc. through a perceived style of ‘athletic grace and 
prowess’. Note that this being-in-the-world of Nike 
Inc. only exists in the interstices of my aesthetic 
relation to it; ‘‘these are only – my truths’’ (Nietzsche, 
in Derrida, p. 374). Nike Inc. in its physical presence 
of employees, corporate ofﬁces, ﬁnancial statements, 
etc. is a style-less nexus of contracts with its ‘‘petty, 
pitiable bustling’’. However, when I sensually 
experience Nike’s logo, advertising, products – when 
I don my Nike running shoes – I aesthetically dis­
tance myself from this ‘Nike-as-nexus-of-contracts’. 
I do not see this latter physical and intellectual pres­
ence. What I see is myself reﬂected in Nike’s stylistic 
prism of athletic-grace-and-prowess: I see ‘‘my 
happier ego, my second immortalized self’’. Thus, at 
the most basic sensory level Nike Inc. is this stylized 
projection of myself: ‘‘In art we are given what we 
seek: a mirror through which we may see ourselves in 
the form of a more gloriﬁed other…’’ (Lacan, [1977], 
2008, p. 153). Through my sensory interaction with 
– my aesthetic relation to – this pair of shoes I try to 
board the ‘‘great sailing ship’’. 
In Lacanian terms, a powerful style plays on our 
‘‘insatiable appetite for otherness’’ (in Cazeaux, 
2000, p. 496). This style should not be confused with 
product design: the latter exists as a physical charac­
teristic of the shoes; the former resides purely in my 
aesthetic relation to them. Therefore, a pair of shoes 
may posses certain distinctive design characteristics – 
e.g., stitching conﬁgurations, fabric combinations, 
logo positioning, colour combinations, etc. – but it 
is only in my aesthetic relation to this pair of shoes 
that the style of ‘athletic-grace-and-prowess’ emer­
ges. From the designer’s perspective, the challenge is 
to invoke the desired style; but the style itself is what 
Genette terms an ‘‘emergent property’’ (p. 92): 
Nike’s-style-as-athletic-grace-and-prowess does not 
exist physically within the design of the shoe, ‘grace’ 
and ‘prowess’ are ‘‘evaluative predicates’’ (ibid.) that 
I use to describe Nike’s style. This style is, in turn, 
my most fundamental conjuring of Nike Inc. as a 
phenomenon of my experience in the world. 
Thus Nike’s, or any ﬁrm’s, fundamental being 
resides in its myriad aesthetic relations with indi­
viduals. Whether these relations coalesce into a style, 
or even a grand style, depends upon whether the 
emergent properties of the ﬁrm’s sensory projections 
are consistently interpreted: Do the same evaluative 
predicates apply from multiple perspectives? Or 
(returning to Nietzsche’s metaphor), on the churn­
ing seas of aesthetic chaos, does the ﬁrm coalesce as 
an identiﬁable and objectiﬁable sailing ship? 
However, this ship is only distinct from a dis­
tance. As Derrida observes, this style both veils and 
reveals in the sense that it reveals the ‘‘non-truth of 
truth’’ (1991, p. 359): ‘‘All the attributes, all the 
traits, all the attractions that Nietzsche saw in woman 
– seductive distance, captivating inaccessibility, and 
inﬁnitely veiled promise, the transcendence that 
produces desire, the Entfernung – belong indeed to 
the history of truth as history of an error’’ (p. 368). 
The great-sailing-ship-as-stylized-ideal exists to ‘re­
veal’ to me the ‘truth-as-non-truth’ of my aesthetic 
relation to Nike: in ‘truth’ neither I nor Nike Inc. 
are athletic-grace-and-prowess. This ﬁrm’s essential 
being in my relation only to exists behind the ‘veil’ 
of aesthetic distance. 
These hypothetical Nike-running-shoes-as-stylis­
tic-cipher play a conceptually similar role to the pair 
of peasant shoes in Heidegger’s description of art-as­
truth-put-to-work in a painting by Van Gogh. He­
idegger argues that Van Gogh’s painting un-conceals 
some fundamental truth-of-being of peasant life: ‘‘From 
the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the 
toilsome tread of the worker stares forth’’ 
([1935–1936], 1971, p. 33). Unlike Nietzsche and 
Derrida, Heidegger’s revealed truth of the peasant 
woman was a truth-as-such, rather than a truth-as-an­
error, but the conceptualization of art ‘un-concealing’ 
is similar. Nietzsche’s style/stylus reveals a fantastical 
truth – a non-truth: ‘‘The sense of penetration is ever 
present, but the core is never reached’’ (Thiele, 1990). 
The power of Nike Inc.’s style over me is to beguile 
me with the Lacanian (1977) ‘mirror fantasy’. A ﬁrm 
that conjures a style that ‘works’ – that puts (non)­
truth to work – has conjured a telos: Nike Inc.’s grand 
style of athletic-grace-and-prowess provides for me 
an ideal, an excellence, a vision of human ﬂourishing, 
to which I strive through my relation to the ﬁrm. 
Normative implications for management 
Clearly a ﬁrm would wish its style to be enticing and 
beguiling. However, to what extent do managers 
exert power to sculpt their respective ﬁrm’s style? It 
is true that this style is a seductive fantasy – a 
beautiful ‘‘ghost ship’’ – and as such a deception or 
mask that arises in the aesthetic relation between me 
and the ﬁrm. However as Thiele, in summarizing 
Nietzsche’s Politics of the Soul, observes: ‘‘the point of 
wearing masks is not so much to deceive as to grow 
into them’’ (1990, p. 65). Therefore, the ﬁrm must 
grow into its style: ‘‘Style is the exhibition of a self-
overcoming…[It can]…lend the appearance of unity 
to a plurality’’ (pp. 64–65). Therefore, to return to 
Nike Inc., if I perceive Nike’s style as athletic-grace­
and-prowess, I should see that reﬂected in all my 
aesthetic relations with this ﬁrm. Whatever sensory 
impacts this ﬁrm projects – through product design, 
marketing, press releases, logos, the company name 
itself – should hold up to me a mirror of my ‘fan­
tastical’ projection: ‘‘Even the smallest fragment of 
the individual’s activity, like a broken piece of 
holographic plate, can be projected to yield an image 
of the whole’’ (p. 213). 
However, style clearly is not entirely within the 
control of the ﬁrm. It is, as deﬁned earlier, an 
‘‘emergent property’’ arising from my aesthetic 
relation to the ﬁrm: Nike may want to project a 
uniﬁed style, but it is ultimately up to the subject to 
‘read’ Nike as it wants to be read. For example, you 
the reader of this article have some aesthetic relation 
to Nike Inc.; you have no choice (even if you do not 
‘own’ any aspect of Nike, you see the products, 
maybe see the advertising, see the logo, hear the 
name). However, you may not ‘read’ Nike as I do: 
your aesthetic relation to this ﬁrm may not elicit the 
grand style of athletic-grace-and-prowess. Far from 
the great-sailing-ship, the aesthetic impact of Nike 
Inc. on you may be merely a dissonant clamor of 
ﬂotsam and jetsam. If you are typical, then this ﬁrm 
would not constitute a grand style; its being in the 
world would be compromised. Its truth-as-non­
truth would be too heavily veiled; the mirror fantasy 
too clouded and distorted. 
In addition, as beings-in-the-world ﬁrms exist 
through time. The mirror fantasies shift with the seas 
of aesthetic chaos. Compare, for example, the 
modernist gravitas of corporate names such as 
International Business Machines, and Hewlett 
Packard, with the postmodern playfulness of Yahoo! 
and Google; as Herwitz observes: ‘‘Aesthetics is al­
ways of its time, in spite of its universalizing claims. 
…Art expresses the aspirations of the age in idealized 
form’’ (2008, pp. 125 and 153). Thus, whatever 
Nike’s stylistic projections, both it and me are 
thrown into an aesthetic relation in a pre-existing 
and evolving cultural milieu: the ‘‘aspirations of the 
age’’ will ebb and ﬂow. Likewise Nike’s, or any 
ﬁrm’s, ability to project a grand style – a great sailing 
ship – will ebb and ﬂow. 
This temporal and indeterminate nature of style 
will also add to the challenges of a ﬁrm that strives to 
alter its style. Indeed, the grander the ﬁrm’s original 
style the more resistant this may prove to alteration. 
Also, a broad diversity of aesthetic relations – as 
experienced by a conglomerate such as GE or 
Unilever – will clearly add to the challenges of 
projecting a uniﬁed style; in such cases the style may 
attach more to a particular brand or subsidiary than 
to the ﬁrm itself. For example, if I enter into an 
aesthetic relation with Ben&Jerry’s website home-
page – deriving pleasure from its bright colours and 
faux-bucolic artistry – I am experiencing a style 
projected by Ben&Jerry’s. The fact that legally 
Ben&Jerry’s is a wholly owned subsidiary of Uni­
lever in no way affects my aesthetic relation. Whe­
ther we attach this relation to the ‘word’ 
Ben&Jerry’s, or the ‘word’ Unilever, may matter 
legally or economically, but not aesthetically. What 
matters is that the colourful and faux-bucolic style 
enticed and beguiled me; it revealed – in a veiled 
fashion – the essential truth-as-non-truth of which is 
‘labelled’, in the sense of being signiﬁed by the word 
Ben&Jerry’s. The economic challenge for the man­
agers of Unilever is to ensure, to the limited extent it 
is within their power, that the style projected by the 
word/brand ‘Ben&Jerry’s’ endures through time 
(which is presumably why the word ‘Unilever’ is 
absent from Ben&Jerry’s homepage). 
The examples of Nike and Ben&Jerry’s above have 
focused on the aesthetic impact of the ﬁrms’ products-
logos-websites; I am cast in the role of the ‘consumer’. 
This seems reasonable given that the vast majority of 
our sensory relations with ﬁrms are through contact 
with products-logos-websites. However, presumably 
if I were an employee of, say, Nike Inc. my aesthetic 
relation with the ﬁrm would be much deeper, 
encompassing my experience of physical buildings, 
co-workers, interior and exterior designs, provision 
of food and drink, etc. Indeed, in The Aesthetics of 
Organization, Strati goes ‘inside’ the ﬁrm and assigns 
the label ‘aesthetic’ to ‘‘personal idiosyncrasies, spe­
ciﬁc modes of interpreting events, different views of 
what to do and when to do it, and the ceaseless 
negotiation of values, symbols and organizational 
practices’’ (1999, p. 1). Here, Strati is clearly 
stretching the aesthetic label beyond the deﬁnition of 
‘sensory relation’ that I use here; but sufﬁce to say that, 
for those ‘within’ the organization, the aesthetic 
relations become more numerous and nuanced. 
However, again the central premise remains: the 
richness, the beauty of my aesthetic relation with Nike 
Inc. will depend on Nike’s style of athletic-grace-and­
prowess permeating my relation; enabling me to dis­
tance myself and objectify the ﬁrm as an aesthetic 
whole. The buildings, furnishings, decorations, food 
and drink, etc. should possess – to my sensory per­
ception – the emergent property of athletic-grace­
and-prowess. If this is the case, then Nike Inc. has 
achieved a grand style; the ﬁrm is a work of art. 
Conclusion 
Nietzsche famously quipped that ‘‘with three anec­
dotes, it is possible to convey the image of any 
individual’’ (Miller, 1993, p. 366). The aesthetic 
theory of the ﬁrm developed here could be deﬁned 
by paraphrasing Nietzsche: ‘with three emergent 
properties, it should be possible to convey the image 
of any ﬁrm’. If this is the case, then the ﬁrm is a grand 
style. How does this theory of the ﬁrm as grand style 
relate, if at all, to more conventional notions of the 
nature and purpose of business? 
In the case of the nature of business, theories from 
various perspectives tend to coalesce around the 
notion of the ﬁrm as a theatre of human interaction: 
serving human needs, whether economic, psycho­
logical or social (Etzioni, 1988; Newton and Ford, 
2004; Solomon, 1994). Perhaps the most succinct 
conceptualization is that ﬁrst delineated by Jensen 
and Meckling, building on the work of Coase 
(1937). This is the notion of the ﬁrm as a ‘‘legal 
ﬁction…[serving]…as a nexus for a set of contractual 
relations among individuals’’. They go onto note 
that ‘‘viewed in this way it makes little or no sense to 
try to distinguish those things which are ‘inside’ the 
ﬁrm from those things that are ‘outside’ of it. There 
is in a very real sense only a multitude of complex 
relationships…’’ (1976, p. 311). The aesthetic-the­
ory-of-the-ﬁrm outlined here bears some notable 
similarities to Jensen and Meckling’s conceptualiza­
tion. Both theories recognize the conceptual 
boundaries of the ﬁrm as porous: the ﬁrm exists in 
relations, whether contractual or aesthetic. Both 
theories recognize the ‘ﬁctional’ nature of the ﬁrm, 
whether in terms of law or in terms of aesthetic 
subjectivity. Where the theories clearly differ in their 
philosophical grounding: their fundamental presup­
position of the impact of the ﬁrm on the world. 
With Jensen and Meckling this fundamental impact 
is legal/economic: the relations are ‘contractual’ 
relations, both explicit and implicit. With the aes­
thetic-theory-of-the-ﬁrm the fundamental relations 
are aesthetic: the ﬁrm’s emergent being through time is 
its immediate sensory impact on individuals. To 
some extent, therefore, this aesthetic approach 
bridges the gap between economic and social no­
tions of business: the ﬁrm-as-style taps into human 
needs at the most fundamental sensory level, both 
preceding and subsuming the economic and social. 
In the case of the purpose of the ﬁrm the divergence 
of opinion again tends to focus around the perceived 
economic role of the ﬁrm versus its social role: col­
loquially, stockholders-versus-stakeholders (Bowie 
and Freeman, 1992). However, again the aesthetic 
theory of the ﬁrm tends to subvert this divide: here the 
purpose of the ﬁrm can be deﬁned as the achievement 
of a grand style that will fulﬁl the ‘mirror fantasy’ 
need/desire of individuals for beauty. This beauty-
prerogative taps into moral imperatives of the ﬁrm 
such as to provide meaningful work and a sense of craft 
or vocation (Bowie, 1991; Klein, 1998; MacIntyre, 
1984). Also, in the oft perceived connection between 
the beautiful and the good (Murdoch, 1980; Nehemas 
1998; Stewart 2005), this ﬁrm-as-style taps into broader 
notions of corporate moral responsibility. 
Therefore, as an attempt to locate the funda­
mental being of the ﬁrm – to address the question: ‘Is 
the ﬁrm?’ – the aesthetic-theory-of-the-ﬁrm out­
lined here provides another perspective on what 
Jensen recently noted as the ‘‘remarkable division of 
opinion about the fundamental purpose of the cor­
poration’’ (2001, p. 8). 
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